ARTICLE

APPLICATION OF THE CHARTER TO UNIVERSITIES' LIMITATION OF EXPRESSION
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms applies only to governmental action. As a result of this limited scope of application, there have been significant questions concerning its application to post-secondary education contexts. Although early case law appeared to establish universities as a Charter-free zone, later cases have made clear that this is not the case. This paper uses Justice Deschamps's rearticulated rule on Charter application to make this point clear, shows that this revised approach is showing itself in case law, and challenges claims that academic freedom gives reasons not to see Charter application in a university context. Indeed, the paper argues that in the present context, Charter application actually seems likely to further the values of academic freedom.
I. Introduction
Questions about the application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1 have been heavily contested in the context of post-secondary education. 2 The challenging aspect of these questions arises because the Canadian Charter, unlike the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, 3 applies only to governments. 4 The Quebec framework works quite differently and has, for instance, enabled the application of the Quebec Charter even as between students in the context of competing views and actions related to a student strike. 5 Leading case law that first distinguished governmentallycontrolled actors to which the Canadian Charter would apply from non-governmental actors to which it would not apply involved postsecondary education. The famous McKinney and Douglas/Kwantlen cases drew distinctions between different kinds
1.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Schedule B to the Constitution Act, 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) .
2.
The other prevalent context involves health care issues. See e.g. Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483 and Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General) , [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 [Eldridge] (latter extending former's focus on government control to also look at governmental activities, in context of hospital delivering government health care programmes in a discriminatory manner).
3.
Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12. 4.
On Territories; and (b) to the legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the authority of the legislature of each province." That the Charter applies only to governments is actually an important way of ensuring that it properly achieves the values it sets out to achieve. If the Charter applied to private actors, the constraints imposed upon individuals' liberty through such application would actually defeat rather than serve the cause of protecting individuals' fundamental freedoms.
5.
See Beausoleil v. of postsecondary educational institutions based on the degree of government control to which they were subjected. 6 This early case law based on traditional governance structures, while subjecting many post-secondary institutions other than universities to the Charter, seemed to many to put universities generally into a Charter-free zone. While other educational contexts have seen a deep engagement with the implications of the Charter for expansions of student rights, 7 university administrators have revelled in the sanctity of an elite position above Charter challenges. 8 But, as this paper will argue, newer case law makes it clear that this position has effectively been overturned in so far as universities are actually carrying out governmental activity. The university context has remained subject to contestation over recent years. The Greater Vancouver case, in which Justice Deschamps applied and succinctly restated Eldridge's 9 expanded framework for Charter application, 10 was on one factual level about advertising on buses but interestingly involved advertisements sought to be purchased by the Canadian Federation of Students. 11 And, in recent years, the Alberta courts' consideration of Charter application in the context of the Pridgen 12 case on a university's attempt to censor students' Facebook postings marks a significant new discussion of the implications of the changes made in Eldridge 13 and Greater Vancouver. 14 The Pridgen case evoked a whole new wave of comments on the possibility of Charter
9.
Eldridge, prec., note 2. 10.
Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation of Students -British Columbia Component, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 295, par. 16 (Greater Vancouver) (Deschamps J. summarizing effect of Eldridge, prec., note 2 as leading to the following rule: "Thus, there are two ways to determine whether the Charter applies to an entity's activities: by enquiring into the nature of the entity or by enquiring into the nature of its activities. If the entity is found to be "government", either because of its very nature or because the government exercises substantial control over it, all its activities will be subject to the Charter. If an entity is not itself a government entity but nevertheless performs governmental activities, only those activities which can be said to be governmental in nature will be subject to the Charter.") 11.
Id., par. 3-4. 12.
Pridgen v. There are, of course, ordinary Charter application cases that merely happen to arise in a university context but that do not engage any special considerations because of the university context. 18 For example, searches of a dorm room by a university's security personnel are subject to normal Charter application analysis in terms of whether the security personnel were functioning at the time as state agents. 19 Or, a student uttering threats will not find Charter freedom of expression values applied against university discipline proceedings, but this will be because of standard rules on lack of freedom of expression protection for threats rather than out of any distinctive feature of the university context. 20 The more interesting set of issues on Charter application to universities are those arising in ways that engage the distinctive values and character of universities, notably those such as universities' limitation of expression for various reasons, with these situations also often implicitly interacting with at least some issues of academic freedom. This paper seeks to explore these issues, to present a larger theoretical framework on the interaction of academic freedom with questions of Charter application than is typically contemplated, and to argue ultimately that there is room for Charter application to universities without any threat to their distinctive values and, indeed, with the possibility that Charter application may actually enhance the fulfillment of those values in contexts where universities have strayed from them.
limits on freedom of expression, with an application of the general rule that constitutionally protected expression does not include threats. Indeed, one could even read the judgment as actually presuming or even advocating for Charter application against university disciplinary proceedings aimed at student expression. The Court states at par. 35: "With respect to the first issue, namely Mr. Zhang's constitutional right to free speech, as afforded him by s. 2(a) and (b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and Part I, s. 6 of the University of Western Ontario's Code of Student Conduct, we have no doubt whatever about the correctness of the decision of the appeal committee. This court is mindful of the historical importance of encouraging free speech on university campuses, and rigorously defending the right of students to debate difficult and often highly unpopular issues with passion. However, free speech has its limits, including the making of threats and defamation of character. Uttering threats is proscribed by the Canadian Criminal Code. Defamatory libel is a serious tort. In the instant case, the panel found after hearing viva voce testimony from Mr. R. that he felt personally threatened by the Facebook posting of Mr. Zhang. In so finding, the panel was right to conclude that the applicant was not protected by his professed right to free speech. To do so, Part II briefly reviews the rule offered on Charter application by Justice Deschamps in Greater Vancouver, 22 the significance of the change reflected in it as compared to early 1990s jurisprudence, and how it properly leads to the Pridgen position in favour of universities not being "Charter-free zones". 23 The recognition of the expanded rule on Charter application crystallized effectively in Justice Deschamps's statement is of course not novel, but the resulting application to the university context has been less discussed. Part III categorizes several specific contexts in which the regulation of speech at universities has become a hotly contested area that has led to new advocacy for Charter application. Part IV examines the main worries of universities about Charter application in this context, showing that the properly considered worries relate to certain dimensions of academic freedom, which the paper seeks to situate within something of a theoretical framework on academic freedom that partly draws upon American jurisprudence in this area. Part V briefly argues that application of the Charter in the ways implied by Justice Deschamps's rule as interpreted in recent case law does not pose a threat to values of academic freedom, properly understood, and may actually enhance the fulfillment of these values. In doing so, Part V also identifies a variety of possible emerging areas of contestation in the area of universities and expression, trying to show in these specific contexts that Charter application may actually help guide universities back to a mission of being places of debate.
II. Justice Deschamps's Rule in Greater Vancouver
The actual issue of Charter application in Greater Vancouver was not especially difficult on the facts of the case. 24 Both transit authorities in the case were easily found to be controlled by government and thus not even to need Charter application by a different route. However, Deschamps J. nonetheless helpfully
22.
Greater Vancouver, prec., note 10.
23.
Pridgen Trial, prec., note 12, par. 69 ("I am satisfied that the University is not a Charter-free zone"). 24.
In Greater Vancouver, prec., note 10, the transit authorities that declined political advertising were fairly easily recognized as being government.
of the Charter 141 to Universities' Limitation of Expression restated the legal framework within which this conclusion was now situated. She explained the basic framework as follows:
Thus, there are two ways to determine whether the Charter applies to an entity's activities: by enquiring into the nature of the entity or by enquiring into the nature of its activities. If the entity is found to be "government", either because of its very nature or because the government exercises substantial control over it, all its activities will be subject to the Charter. If an entity is not itself a government entity but nevertheless performs governmental activities, only those activities which can be said to be governmental in nature will be subject to the Charter. 25 The second branch, focused on governmental activities, is a branch that has grown since Eldridge. 26 There, the conclusion in Stoffman 27 that hospitals are not themselves government if they are not under sufficient government control was adjusted to recognize that certain activities of hospitals, in so far as they were delivering government programs and carrying out government policy objectives, could be governmental activities. 28 Governmental activities need not be required in statutory form but can encompass a broader range of policy and program delivery. 29 Where an action is a delivery of a government policy or program, that governmental activity is subject to the Charter's application, even if other activities of the same entity are not-this is the rule that Deschamps J. crystallizes so succinctly in Greater Vancouver. 30 
25.
Id., par. 31 To say as much should not be surprising in so far as Eldridge 32 marked a departure from Stoffman 33 and a subsequent recognition that hospitals are not "Charter-free zones". The same principle naturally applies against McKinney itself-where McKinney could have been read as precluding the application of the Charter to universities in general terms, the rule that developed in Eldridge and was given clear voice by Deschamps J. in Greater Vancouver says that if some activities of universities amount to delivery of government policies and programs, then those activities will be subject to the Charter. Universities are not "Charter-free zones". 34 Although that point was not widely noticed immediately after Eldridge, logical and legal consistency can lead to no other conclusion.
This application of the Charter to specific activities of universities has now received recognition through to the Court of Appeal level in Alberta. The case of Pridgen v. University of Calgary 35 involved the university imposing disciplinary proceedings against two young students for posting comments on their Facebook walls in which they criticized a sessional lecturer as having been an ineffective teacher. The students objected to the restriction of their expression and ultimately pursued litigation.
At trial, the judge highlighted a passage in McKinney that could lead to a reading of it that is consistent with the later case 31.
McKinney v. In my view, the circumstances in this case are analogous to those in Eldridge as the University is acting as the agent of the provincial government in providing accessible post-secondary education services to students in Alberta pursuant to the provisions of the PSL Act… In this context, I find that the University is tasked with implementing a specific government policy for the provision of accessible post-secondary education to the public in Alberta, thus bringing the facts of this case into line with Eldridge. 38 This trial decision was upheld by the Alberta Court of Appeal, albeit in a somewhat more confusing manner than needed to be the case. The lead judgment of Paperny J.A. carries out a masterful overview of different categories of Charter application, each of which she goes on to detail, but which she could summarize as follows:
A review of the authorities yields five broad categories of government or government activities to which the Charter applies.
1. Legislative enactments; 2.
Government actors by nature; 3.
Government actors by virtue of legislative control; 4.
Bodies exercising statutory authority; and
36.
Id., note 12, par. 38, quoting McKinney, prec., note 6 at par. 42 ("There may be situations in respect of specific activities where it can fairly be said that the decision is that of the government, or that the government sufficiently partakes in the decision as to make it an act of government, but there is nothing here to indicate any participation in the decision by the government and, as noted, there is no statutory requirement imposing mandatory retirement on the universities").
37.
Pridgen Trial, prec., note 12, par. 42-48, culminating in par. 48 ("As the Supreme Court recognized in Eldridge, the Charter may apply in one of two ways; it may apply to a government actor or it may apply to non-government actors responsible for the implementation of a specific government policy or activity").
38.
Id., par. 59 and 63. Justice Paperny would have held the Charter to apply on the same basis as the trial judge had held, in the form of the university's implementation of governmental policy in the area of postsecondary education, but she suggested there was another alternative route to application on the facts of the case in terms of the statutory compulsion the university exercised against the students. 40
Justice McDonald wrote a separate concurring judgment based solely on administrative law grounds, preferring not to decide the Charter application issue. 41 Justice O'Ferrall rounded things out with a third concurring judgment in which he held that the university bodies ought to have considered civil rights values like freedom of expression in their decision-making, although not necessarily because of Charter application but also because of longstanding traditions of freedom of expression within the common law. 42 One could almost characterize the situation as one of three judges with four opinions. But it nonetheless seems right to take the opinion of Paperny J.A. as the lead judgment, which answered the questions put before the Court, and which can derive further support from dimensions of O'Ferrall J.A.'s slightly more equivocal analysis.
The rule developed in part in Eldridge and put powerfully by Deschamps J. in Greater Vancouver leads to a conclusion, as recognized by Paperny J.A. in the Alberta Court of Appeal in Pridgen, that the Charter can apply to some activities of universities, particularly when the activities in question are implementing governmental policies.
39.
Pridgen CA, prec., note 12, par. 78.
40.
Id., par. 104-106.
41.
Id., par. 130.
42.
Id., par. 178. 
III. Contested Instances of Charter Application to Universities
This reality that universities are not immune to the Charter raises, however, the question of in what activities universities are subject to the Charter. A full-fledged answer could well examine many different areas of university policy. However, the particular area that has been contentious in recent case law concerns several spheres in which universities have acted in ways limiting expression. It is however possible to identify several categories within these expression-limiting actions, so as to consider the possibility that there are pertinent distinctions between some of them. For the moment, for purposes of this part, it is worth simply categorizing applications that have already received attention in the limited case law to date, with Part V later turning to more prospective possibilities.
One category has consisted of limitation of expression by students concerning the university itself. The Pridgen case fits this category in so far as it concerned student comment on the teaching a university provided. 43 A second category has consisted of limitation of expression by individuals (including non-students) on matters that could be under discussion within a university, encompassing within broad academic terms potentially all matters of human existence. Freedom of expression challenges have succeeded, for example, in some instances against universities that sought to preclude individuals from placing flyers on vehicles that presented individuals' (controversial and quite possibly emotionally distressing to some readers) perspectives on issues of morality and public policy that might reasonably be thought to be under discussion within a university. 44 expression rights were an important dimension in a recent determination against the University of Calgary in constraints it had put on students' political and moral expression (requiring them to display placards in a certain manner to limit their visibility) on a controversial public policy issue. 45 A third category could consist of challenges to academic judgment on expression, with there having been instances where students challenged academic judgments that their work did not meet particular standards (of excellence or of success). 46 Already, it might be apparent that the first two categories are different from the third. As will be elaborated in the next Part, the first two relate to expression that has actually traditionally been at the core of what academic freedom protects, and a limitation on this expression purportedly based on academic freedom thus comes across immediately as tension-laden. The third category, however, consists of what is actually a challenge to the exercise of a dimension of academic freedom; part of academic freedom is the exercise of proper academic judgment on things expressed. 47 The third category of limitation thus might be much more readily Bench holding that Charter applied in context of university having adopted bylaws that were used to prevent Whatcott from putting flyers on cars).
45.
See Wilson v. University of Calgary, 2014 ABQB 190 (Horner J. ultimately concluding, based on a mixture of reasons including the severity of threat to Charter expression rights in the university's conduct, that the university had not provided sufficient appeal mechanisms for the students, with the university's later determinations resulting from the judgment in more recent months ultimately finding in favour of the students justified as against application of the Charter (even though one could obviously imagine instances in which it would be abused).
However, there are further categories of cases that have also arisen that may initially seem of a significantly different category but are actually arguably closer to the educational context than may be first apparent. These concern regulation by a university of dimensions of student government 48 or of extracurricular activities, including through allocation of space for extracurricular activities. 49 Courts have rejected Charter application in some such cases, notably in Lobo v. Carleton University. 50 The case concerned a claim by students to use space for their extracurricular activities that involved the expression of particular moral, religious, and political views, and the trial court held that the university decision was not subject to the Charter because it was not implementing any specific governmental program or policy, 51 something the Court of Appeal upheld in an oral judgment of a scant few paragraphs. 52 One question that arises is whether the informal curriculum of an educational institution can be so easily distinguished from the formal curriculum, so as to say that student extracurricular activities have no place within their educational experience and academic activity. 53 If this distinction cannot be so fiercely drawn, then it may be that this category is no different than others in which student expression of views is limited.
48.
For an example, see 
IV. Academic Freedom and Charter Application
Universities themselves have not been enthusiastic to see the Charter apply to their activities. At one level, this reticence reflects a simple desire to avoid the legal complexity that may ensue, as they then have to distinguish between university activities to which the Charter does and does not apply and test their activities for Charter compliance, no doubt at meaningful financial cost. Any business owner could likely empathize with the challenges awaiting university administrators subjected to a new layer of legal complexity. However, in many contexts, there have been holdings that mere administrative inconvenience is no reason to reject Charter claims, 54 and the same principle surely applies here to Charter application.
A separate argument raises academic freedom, whether in more general terms or in terms of institutional independence of academic institutions. Both arguments were put at the Alberta Court of Appeal in Pridgen. 55 This argument certainly seems more important than the question of administrative inconvenience for academic institutions. If academic institutions are a sphere unto themselves, deserving of institutional independence and academic freedom, the claim that they are properly outside the scope of the Charter has more plausibility. The implications of this extension, however, do not weigh easily in favor of any academic institutional immunity from Charter scrutiny, at least in the particular context of freedom of expression. The very purposes of such a freedom make freely exchanged ideas quite central to its fulfillment. So, if the main contexts giving rise to issues, as suggested in the last Part, concern university limitations on expression, then there is little reason to identify academic freedom giving rise to a reason for constraint on Charter application. In this context, Charter application actually furthers the values of academia.
That said, some could object that the Charter was not necessarily designed for purposes of regulating universities and that application via s. 32 is thus something of a blunt instrument for oversight of universities and one that threatens institutional independence. On such an argument, academic freedom would then be constrained by Charter application, and there would be preferable means of oversight, such as the institution of the university "visitor". 63 And, indeed, there might well be some core academic activities-such as the critical assessment of ideas through exercise of academic judgment-that merit profound deference. 64 There will even be needs for academic organization that may give rise to reason to defer to certain institutional decisions. 65 generally Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 570 U.S. ___ (2013) However, it is frankly not clear that there is anything in the idea of academic freedom that obviously, inherently calls for Charter immunity. Universities as Charter-free zones have shown themselves, as institutions, to be subject to forces that lead them away from their own values. As the last Part will show, in the kinds of situations where Charter claims are arising, application of the Charter actually has the potential to preserve academic values.
V. Charter Application as Furthering Academic Values
Given the kind of situations in which Charter application to universities has been argued, there is reason to say that Charter application could actually further academic values. Justice Paperny in Pridgen engages in some analysis of the academic freedom arguments, and she concludes as follows:
In my view, there is no legitimate conceptual conflict between academic freedom and freedom of expression. Academic freedom and the guarantee of freedom of expression contained in the Charter are handmaidens to the same goals; the meaningful exchange of ideas, the promotion of learning, and the pursuit of knowledge. There is no apparent reason why they cannot comfortably coexist. That said, if circumstances arise where these values actually collide, a section 1 analysis would be required to properly balance them. That circumstance does not arise in this case. 66 Two key points are present in this passage. First, there is no conflict between academic freedom and freedom of expression. Second, there is a way to take into account the considerations of academic freedom elsewhere in the Charter analysis rather than as giving rise to an argument against Charter application. Quite simply, the availability of a limitations analysis means that there always remains a mechanism by which academic freedom considerations can be part of the analysis. Where universities limit particular organizations, with organizational dimension to university's rights).
66.
Pridgen CA, prec., note 12, par. 117. Charter rights, they may have a justification for doing so in considerations of academic freedom, but they should need to prove this justification rather than simply to wave around generalized academic freedom considerations before claiming Charter immunity.
Within a short article focused specifically on identifying the application of the Charter to university freedom of expression issues, it would of course be out of place to attempt a complete typology of possible freedom of expression issues that may arise on campus. Such a typology would relate more to a substantive Charter analysis of campus expression. However, it is nonetheless worth identifying the sorts of issues that Charter application in this context may open to constitutional scrutiny, so as to reinforce the point that Charter application actually has prospects of furthering academic freedom.
University campuses have actually become places where freedom of expression comes under many different sorts of threats, a phenomenon not unique to Canada. Indeed, the United States has seen some of the issues much more exposed and scrutinized. 67 However, many of the sorts of restraints on expression on university campuses have overlapped those in Canada. As catalogued by those examining restraints on campus expression, they have included such matters as: constraints on student groups expressing views on controversial issues; viewpoint constraints, such as in the cancellation of speakers promulgating views on controversial issues; campus speech codes of various sorts that often have chilling effects beyond those intended; and removals of individuals from academic posts based on expression of particular viewpoints. 68 67.
See Another category, of course, whose status as "on-campus" or "offcampus" is sometimes part of the issue at stake pertains to university disciplining of students for cyberspeech that may or may not have any physical link to campus, with such discipline arising overwhelmingly from negative comments about school officials. 69 Notably, many of these constraints on expression actually limit or chill academic speech or speech on the sort of policy issues in which one would hope students and faculty would engage.
To the extent they are focused on facilitating matters like equal participation in the educational environment, some of these restraints on expression will of course gain greater sympathy within the Canadian context, where less absolutist versions of freedom of expression prevail than in the United States. Thus, whereas the regulation by universities of actual expressions of hatred in the United States needs to focus on forms of expression actually promoting intimidation, 70 there will be more possible arguments to raise within a Canadian proportionality analysis for rights limitation. With that reality, there is very little prospect that Charter
